Newsletter 78
Thinking through some Winter scenarios
It’s worth perhaps mulling over the next 6 months in world affairs, and doing some thought exercises on the future. We are at a dangerous juncture in the Russo-Ukrainian war, and things are potentially getting much more dangerous. So let’s look at three scenarios - nuclear response, gas and communications. These are not the only possible ones - we could look at others - but they are interesting to focus on.
The Conventional Response to Nuclear use
In the last edition I linked to some scenario analysis for how Russia might employ tactical nuclear weapons, and how Ukraine and the West might respond. In another interview over the weekend, former US general and former CIA chief David Petraeus laid out the following scenario if Russia did use a tactical nuclear weapon:
“We would respond by leading a NATO collective effort that would take out every Russian conventional force that we could see and identify on the battlefield in Ukraine and Crimea, as well as all Russian ships in the Black Sea Fleet.”
This scenario may be deliberately messaged. It’s from a former, though senior general, and may be a warning to Russia of an explicit real world scenario the US is considering. It would involve the employment of 100s of NATO jets, employing first air dominance over Ukraine and the Black Sea, including the destruction of all Russian air defence systems in the region. This would be DEAD/SEAD missions first to secure the airspace to allow more jets to arrive (this would be combined with the destruction of all Russian airbases/jets on the ground in the region (and potentially within the borders of Russia if they are close to Ukraine). It would also mean shooting down any Russian jets that might challenge them.
This would be followed by search and destroy missions to locate every Russian military asset within the territory of Ukraine - every tank, APC/IFV, artillery piece and vehicle would be a target throughout all occupied territories, including Crimea.
In addition he mentions the Black Sea Fleet. This would mean similar air strikes against all Russian surface vessels in the Black Sea (probably using both guided bombs the US has been developing specifically for anti-ship purposes as part of the ‘Quicksink’ program) along with standard air-launched anti-ship missiles.
As for their submarines, it may mean using helicopters along with NATO surface vessels to hunt down and destroy any Russian submarines (there is only so many places a submarine can hide, and for so long, in the Black Sea).
It’s worth noting here that this sort of action would almost certainly lead to US jets and pilots being lost, and it is hard to assess how Russia would respond to such an assault. It would also mean the employment of stealth jets such as the F-35 and F-22 for the first time in modern conventional combat - and F-35s would be the obvious choice for penetrating Russia air defences.
This is one scenario - and I like scenarios because it helps to think through how events may evolve. It may not happen at all - but that’s why they’re called scenarios.
Russia’s economic war is just beginning- gas
Let’s look beyond tactical nuclear weapons for a moment.
Putin/Russia are now in an increasingly desperate situation. Ukraine is winning the war, they are regaining territory and the Russian army - even with a mass mobilisation of 100,000s of men in the coming months - will not be enough to stop it. It is likely Ukraine will continue to gain ground into the winter, and then in the spring commence more assaults to retake the rest of the country back.
But Putin also believes he can pressure the West - particularly Europe - to cease explicitly supporting Ukraine, and strong-arm Europe into convincing Ukraine to sue for peace - but on Putin’s terms.
So what leverage could Putin use against European populations?
We might have an early sign of this in the destruction of the Nordstream pipelines. As I indicated very early after it happened, it was almost certain that Russia did this. People - particularly on the left - implied this would be crazy. But unless anyone has noticed, Putin acting crazy is a ship that has long since sailed. He invaded Ukraine. The explosions that blew up the pipelines came the day after the opening of a pipeline nearby - the Baltic Pipe. The only remaining operational part of Nord Stream is NordStream 2, String B.
What Putin would have been messaging with this attack is: I have the technical ability (likely using submarines or maybe pre-placed remote mines), and the will, to blow up gas infrastructure. One advantage of blowing up undersea infrastructure is plausible deniability. It could take months, or indeed years, to find enough evidence to prove categorically who was behind such an event, if ever. And in the interim period it could be blamed on an accident - a standard Russian/FSB tactic.
So that gives us a scenario to explore.
As the winter gets colder and we are into December and January in Europe (and European populations are feeling the pain of inflation and high energy prices and economies going into recessions), could Putin decide to attack more undersea gas pipelines? I would say yes that is a scenario to consider. Particularly vulnerable in this context, is the UK.
As you can see below (sourced from this), the UK relies largely on gas from the North Sea/Norway and it lands at only a few junctures. Like Germany it’s a heavy gas user. Something to also have in mind is gas storage. The UK stores just 5 days of gas usage.
Any pipeline supply disruption could very quickly impact UK homes and industries that rely on gas supply. (Ireland would in turn be seriously affected, though we also have 25% of our gas coming from the west in the Corrib gas field).
Other countries would be less affected by this supply halt - Germany in particular has been storing up its more than three month supply all year, so would be able to absorb a supply disruption to a greater degree.
What form would an attack take? One scenario is multiple and consecutive explosions blowing open multiple pipelines (perhaps at depths suitable for submarines to gain access). In principle you could imagine scenarios where gas rigs could also be vulnerable to attack. But again, all of these would amount to “accidents” until proven otherwise, and Russia could continue to plausibly (though straining the meaning of the word) deny any involvement. There are also other vulnerable pipelines from Africa into southern Europe.
Of course the gas storage problem poses other problems - like how to get ready for Winter 2023 - where supply constraints may be even more pressing.
Russia’s economic war - communications
Several years ago - back in 2016 - I wrote a post called “The West’s vulnerable undersea cables” outlining this scenario that should a conventional war come to Europe (the scenario I used was NATO v Russia): internet undersea cables could be destroyed.
In 2015 US intelligence was concerned at the interest Russian ships were showing in undersea cables.
In 2017 UK intelligence also warned about the vulnerability of undersea cables with regards to Russia. These may have been mapping rather than interception exercises - to locate both “commercial” cables and “private/secret/military” cables. Back then, I wrote:
In such a scenario it would make sense for Russia not simply to cut these cables, but instead to mine them — and mine them in multiple locations. Indeed you could argue it would make sense to mine them in advance of any possible conflict, but merely as a contingency. So maybe they already are? And it might be also logical to conclude that NATO might do the same, though that seems a little less likely.
If an adversary could cut most or all commercial undersea cables simultaneously (nevermind the secret military ones) it would have a hugely destabilising affect on Western economies. Communications during or in the leadup to conflict are obviously critical, but since the end of the Cold War large portions of global commerce also rely on these undersea cables — which by their nature are vulnerable. Here’s some stuff from McKinsey, emphasis mine:
So let’s take a look:
It is decidedly interesting that subsea cables in the North Sea are close to pipelines. This is likely because they are - the Tampnet network is partly designed to serve gas and oil platforms in the North Sea.
It is also interesting that Russia proposed naval manoeuvres in the area where many transatlantic cables pass to the south of Ireland, just weeks before their invasion of Ukraine. Of course what we don’t know is what submarines may have been involved. But is is worth noting that the cables in this area are the primary cables that connect London to New York - the key communications cables needed for onward transit to Europe and affecting all service providers and commercial activity on the continent.
But as readers of this newsletter will also be aware, there were several other events that preceded the invasion of Ukraine that were likely Russian military actions.
(Newsletter 57) In November 2021 just three months before the war, a Norwegian undersea cable was mysteriously cut:
“Something or someone has torn out cables in outlying areas,” Geir Pedersen, the LoVe project leader, said in a press statement last Friday. Reports indicate that more than 2.5 miles of fiber optic and electrical cables were severed and then removed. In total, LoVe uses more than 40 miles of cables in the Norwegian Sea.
(Newsletter 58). In mid November 2021 Russia carried out an extremely disruptive anti satellite missile test. Remember that most internet traffic occurs over cables, but a significant amount of other traffic is via satellite.
(Newsletter 63). In early January 2022, just 6 weeks before the invasion, another Norwegian undersea cable was cut. This time it was the main cable between Norway and Svalbard.
(Newsletter 63). Also in January 2022, Sweden was on alert for drones near their nuclear power stations.
(Newsletter 67). Four weeks after the invasion I suggested a scenario in which Putin might seek to employ tactical nuclear weapons - a theme that has grown increasingly loud since Russia has begun losing to Ukrainian forces since the Kherson/Kharkiv offensives began in August.
I would argue Russia has form when it comes to telco infrastructure. It has practiced techniques to cut and disrupt and it destroyed in orbiting satellite with a missile just months before the war.
Which is to say the following: should we consider a scenario in which some cables mysteriously stop working over the coming months? Yes we should. Should we allow for a potential Russian escalation in which they shoot down orbiting satellites - yes. (Though their ability to make or use anti satellite missiles is becoming increasingly constrained).
Depending on what cables and when, any disruption to transatlantic internet traffic could be exceptionally disruptive to global commerce, and could impact financial markets significantly. It could be timed to come on top of disruption to energy networks (as outlined earlier) during increasingly low temperatures. If it were a severe disruption, it could actually make it difficult for countries to trade, or indeed transfer cash. Normal web browsing or use of cloud services would also be severely disrupted (again, depending on how successful attacks on infrastructure are), bringing internet-based companies to a halt.
As I have (half) joked on Twitter in the past, one way to prepare is to download everything (including Wikipedia):
Even if these scenarios are even 20% right (and Russia is successful in some of their efforts), we are in for a very interesting few months.
Very good. All three scenarios very plausible.